![]() That’s problematic since Google can’t definitively know that your browser (the intended recipient) actually received the response. This means that the tokens are in your browser’s address bar as a result of the redirect. Notice that after you authenticate, the Authorization Server (like Google) responds directly with tokens. The vulnerabilities were described in depth in the Implement the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code with PKCE Flow post on the Okta blog: In order to avoid these issues, clients SHOULD NOT use the implicit grant (…), unless access token injection in the authorization response is prevented and the aforementioned token leakage vectors are mitigated. This makes replay detection for such access tokens at resource servers impossible. Moreover, no viable mechanism exists to cryptographically bind access tokens issued in the authorization response to a certain client (…). The implicit grant (…) and other response types causing the authorization server to issue access tokens in the authorization response are vulnerable to access token leakage and access token replay (…). Nonetheless, it comes with some severe security vulnerabilities: However, here are the documented reasons why I don’t use them in my application. You can still find tutorials on setting up other Authorization Flows. ![]() In order to execute the authorization flow from Postman, I will have to enter some confidential and environment-sensitive details, e.g. Provide the data required for authorization in Keycloak to the Postman environment PKCE is not a replacement for a client secret, and PKCE is recommended even if a client is using a client secret. However, the documentation advocates using the PKCE extension even when we already apply client secrets: This configuration may appear to provide sufficient protection. Consequently, it provides client secrets when exchanging temporary codes for tokens. In addition, my example Keycloak client is configured with the confidential Access Type. PKCE (RFC 7636) is an extension to the Authorization Code flow to prevent CSRF and authorization code injection attacks. Furthermore, the PKCE description states that: It is recommended that all clients use the PKCE extension with this flow as well to provide better security. The reason for using this particular flow in place of regular Authorization Code is because it provides additional protection against CSRF and authorization code injection attacks.Īs we can read in the Authorization Code Grant Type documentation: I’ll show you how to get access tokens with the Proof Key for Code Exchange Grant Type ( abbreviated PKCE, pronounced “pixie”) which is an extension to the Authorization Code Grant Type. Why we should use the PKCE Grant Type to authorize Postman requests in Keycloak
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